Philosophical views: expanded section
Okumaya devam et...
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| ==Philosophical views== | ==Philosophical views== |
| {{Main|Philosophy of love}} | {{Main|Philosophy of love}} |
| Philosophically, there four types of love that are distinguished: love as a union; love as robust concern; love as valuing; and love as an emotion. Love as a union suggests that love involves the formation of a union between the two individuals, creating a "we". [[Roger Scruton]] and [[Mark Fisher]] emphasize the union of concerns, where the distinction between the lover's different interests dissapears and a new shared care and concern emerges. [[Robert C. Solomon]] views love as a literal fusion between the two individuals, resulting in a shared identity and mutual definition. [[Robert Nozick]] argues that love creates a new "we" through the pooling of well-being and autonomy, as well as the adoption of a joint identity. Critics argue that love as a union undermines individual autonomy and the lovers become unintelligible. However, Nozick and Fisher claim that this loss is a desirable aspect of love. [[Michael Friedman (philosopher)|Michael Friedman]] proposes a federation model, where love creates a new unified entity without erasing individual identities, thus allowing for the concern for the beloved's sake.<ref name=":0" /> | |
| The philosophy of love is a field of [[social philosophy]] and [[ethics]] that attempts to explain the nature of love.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Søren Kierkegaard|first=Søren|last=Kierkegaard|title=[[Works of Love]]|year=1847}}</ref> The philosophical investigation of love includes the tasks of distinguishing between the various kinds of personal love, asking if and how love is or can be justified, asking what the [[value (ethics)|value]] of love is, and what impact love has on the [[autonomy]] of both the lover and the beloved.<ref name="auto"/> | |
| Love as a robust concern posits that love is primarily defined by caring about the beloved's sake, without creating a "we" or any type of union between the lovers. This perspective emphasizes the willing aspect of love, where one's desire and motivations are shaped by concern for the beloved's well-being. Critics of this view argue that the definition is too passive, in the sense that the conception of the beloved overlooks the interactive nature of love, as well as the emotional responsiveness to the beloved. However, defenders argue that promoting the beloved's well-being requires respecting their autonomy and emotional responses. Furthermore, critics claim that the robust concern focus solely on desires and concerns for the beloved's welfare, making it too strict of a definition. Defenders counter that the desire for the beloved's well being is an essential aspect to love. [[Monique wonderly|Monique Wonderly]] suggests that the concept of attachment can complement the robust concern view, capturing the idea that the beloved is not only important for their own sake but also to the lover.<ref name=":0" /> | |
| Love as valuing has two main approaches: love as appraisal of value and love as bestowal of value. [[J. David Velleman]] proposes that the former involves acknowledging and responding uniquely to the value of the beloved. [[Kantianism|Kantian]] distinctions are drawn between dignity and price, dignity being that the value of something is not comparable, and price being that it is comparable; thus people possess dignity due to their rational nature. Love, on this view, responds to the dignity of persons, but it differs from respect in that it disarms emotional defenses, making one vulnerable to the beloved. However, critics argue that Velleman's account struggles to explain the selectivity and constancy of love, as well as the role of emotions in appraisal. [[Peter Singer]] claims that love as a bestowal of value involves bestowing intrisic value upon the beloved. Unlike appraisal, which responds to pre-existing value, bestowal creates value in the beloved. Singer argues that love is non-teleological and cannot be justified, but rather involves attachment and commitment to the beloved. However, critics question how bestowal accounts for the selectivity of love and its discerning nature.<ref name=":0" /> | |
| Finally, love as an emotion is divided in two perspectives: love as emotion proper and love as emotion complex. The former sees love as a particular motivational response to an object, similar to other emotions. However, critics argue that defining love solely as an emotion oversimplifies its nature. [[James Robert Brown]] suggests that love evaluates the beloved as worthwhile, but this perspective fails to capture the complexity of love compared to other evaluative responses like admiration or respect, according to critics. Love as emotion complex understands love as a complex emotional attitude towards another person, involving historical patterns concerning of one's emotional responsiveness to the beloved. It emphasizes the dynamic nature of love, where ther lover's identity is continually transformed by loving the beloved. Emotional responses are interconnected and tied to the historical narrative of the relationship. [[Annette Baier]] and [[Neera K. Badhwar]] emphasize emotional interdependence, while [[Paul Helm]] suggests that love involves intimate identification, where sharing the values of the beloved is central. Critics argue that these views don't answer how to distinguish loving relationship from other relationships and what constitues the characteristic narrative history of love.<ref name=":0" /> | |
| == Literature depictions == | == Literature depictions == |
Okumaya devam et...